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Abstract
The election of  Hassan Rouhani to the Presidency of  the Islamic Republic in 2013 
signalled for many a popular rejection of  the politics of  confrontation endorsed by his 
predecessor Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and support for greater liberalism at home and 
internationalism abroad. With his first term coming to an end and an agreement reached 
on Iran’s nuclear programme, this paper revisits the 2013 presidential election campaign 
and argues that the process retained much of  the intricate management of  previous elec-
tions. A willingness to ‘believe the rhetoric’ of  the campaign has resulted in a dangerous 
mismanagement of  expectations.1 This paper follows on from an earlier book: Ali Ansari, 
Iran, Islam and Democracy: The Politics of  Managing Change, (London: Chatham House, 2006). 
1 An earlier abridged version of  this paper, entitled ‘A Fragile Opportunity’, was published by RUSI in 
October 2013.
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‘Whether in a democratic or in an authoritarian system…power clothes itself  for 
much of  the time in the guise of  normality, of  routine, of  a presence that need not 
be questioned because it is so much part of  the ‘natural’ order of  things’.1
Introduction
The first-round victory of  Hassan Rouhani in the eleventh presidential elections of  the 
Islamic Republic of  Iran took many observers by surprise. One of  eight candidates 
deemed suitable to run by the hardline Guardian Council, he, along with the more openly 
Reformist Mohammad Reza Aref, was generally regarded as an electoral outlier whose 
chief  function was to reignite interest and enthusiasm among the vast swathe of  the Ira-
nian electorate who had become disillusioned by the politics of  the Islamic Republic over 
the last eight years, especially since the electoral debacle of  2009. It was important for 
the regime, and for the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei in particular, to manage 
a successful election, in order to begin removing the deep political stain of  2009 and to 
restore a measure of  legitimacy, not only domestically, but also in the eyes of  the interna-
tional community. For this, a high turnout and a clean process was vital. The former could 
only be achieved by providing a measure of  perceived competition with real issues that 
would matter to those parts of  the electorate that had come to feel alienated. Rouhani’s 
campaign, promising a government of  ‘prudence and moderation’, and liberally endowed 
with slogans that were drawn straight from the Reformist playbook, managed just that. 
His articulate and diplomatic, if  occasionally combative, presentation contrasted starkly 
with the ideologically convoluted and frequently incoherent ramblings of  his main hard-
line opponents. 
In the event, a skilful management of  popular ‘hopes and fears’ catapulted Rouhani to a 
successful (if  marginal) first-round victory taking some 52 percent of  the votes cast with 
a 72 percent turnout. The public elation that followed has tended to disguise the often 
complex and fraught political negotiations that facilitated the election. ‘Distress’ had given 
way to ‘devotion’, such that expectations of  the Rouhani presidency were high.2 It says 
much of  the depth of  the despair that the emotional rebound has been so uncritically 
enthusiastic, but it is also a reflection of  the opaqueness of  the political process that com-
mentators – both inside and outside Iran – rushed to reimagine3 and rationalise the past in 
an effort to explain the election and reinforce (or justify) the enthusiasm that they now felt.4 
1  Charles Tripp, The Power and the People: Paths of  Resistance in the Middle East (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2013), pp. 2–3.
2  Max Weber talks of  ‘a devotion born of  distress and enthusiasm’. See S. N. Eisenstadt (ed), On Cha-
risma and Institution Building: Selected Papers (Chicago: University of  Chicago Press, 1968), p. 23. 
3  The term ‘reimagine’ is used deliberately since many of  the assessments are founded on perceptions 
and motives which remain highly speculative.
4  An excellent example is provided by the Iranian journal Mehrnameh, whose post-election issue is boldly 
titled ‘The second “second” of  Khordad’, drawing a direct analogy between Rouhani and Reformist 
President Khatami whose landslide election victory in 1997 was on the second day of  the Iranian 
month of  Khordad (23 May 1997). In this issue, the otherwise sober Iranian political analyst, Abbas 
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This has resulted in a teleological exercise that has selectively mined the historical record 
to provide evidence for a promising present and optimistic future. Ironing out the inconve-
nient details, it provided a simplified narrative of  progress – one that effectively continues 
to this day. In this reading, Ahmadinejad’s presidency was not only an aberration but one 
of  little consequence to the Islamic Republic’s ‘arc of  history’.5 It was even suggested that 
his presidency represented little more than the normal ebb and flow of  factional politics, 
that the presidential election crisis of  2009 was the exception that proved the rule rather 
than a signifier of  deeper political trends, and that consequently, rehabilitative measures, 
delivered by a president of  high competency, should yield swift benefits. These are nar-
ratives that, for good or ill, have sustained Rouhani through his first term. They both 
reinforce and are reinforced by a particular reading of  his election that eschews detail in 
favour of  emphasising a return to ‘normalcy’. 
As this paper shows, however, far from marking a break with the immediate past, the 
details reveal a managed election process that betrays more continuity than change, with 
clear implications for our understanding of  the Rouhani presidency and its capacity to 
deliver change in the future.
The Burden of History
Two interrelated events have shaped the public imagination and, by extension, the State’s 
approach to the politics of  elections. The first was the election of  the Reformist administra-
tion of  Mohammad Khatami in 1997 and its consequences for the political development 
of  the Islamic Republic; the second and more immediate was the haunting spectre of  the 
politically catastrophic election of  2009, with its debilitating consequences for the popular 
legitimacy of  the Islamic Republic and Ayatollah Khamenei’s personal standing.
Conflicting interpretations of  these events have shaped the opposing narratives used in 
political debate. Rouhani has tried in many ways to stay in between these two narratives. 
If  he erred on the Reformist side prior to the election, he then proceeded to shift towards 
more Conservative interpretations, before returning to a more Reformist reading when 
electoral expediency necessitated it.6 
Abdi writes that Rouhani’s election is bigger than that of  Khatami, because for the first time in 150 
years, an opposition has been formally recognised. Quite apart from the ridiculous timeline, the argu-
ment itself  is contentious. See ‘Special Issue on the Election 92’, Mehrnameh 29, (Tir 1392 / June–July 
2013), pp. 98–106.
5  A contemporary variation on the Whig reading of  history as (inevitable) progress. It is a motif  that 
appears to shape Obama’s view of  the world, see: Jeffrey Goldberg, ‘The Obama Doctrine’, The Atlantic 
Magazine, April 2016.  On the Obama White House’s media strategy see: David Samuels, ‘The Aspiring 
Novelist Who Became Obama’s Foreign Policy Guru’, NYT Magazine, 5 May 2016.
6   For example, despite the occasional rhetoric to the contrary, normally near election times, Rouhani has done 
little to progress the release of  the Green Movement leaders, Mir-Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi, par-
roting the regime line in his first speech as president to commemorate the ‘pro-government’ demonstrations of 
December 2009, see S.R., ‘Row Harder, Rohani’, The Economist, 31 December 2013. Available at: http://www.
economist.com/blogs/pomegranate/2013/12/hopes-fade-iran-s-jailed-reformists (accessed 17 October 2016).
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The Ghost of Khatami
Khatami’s dramatic election victories, particularly those of  1997 and the Majlis elections 
of  2000 when Reformists swept the board, confronted the Conservative establishment 
with the prospect of  real change. Conservative elites sought to undermine him at every 
turn, effectively defining reform as a heresy – and latterly a sedition – that needed to be 
uprooted. At the same time, and perhaps more damagingly, those more sympathetic to 
the idea of  reform increasingly identified Khatami as well-meaning but inconsequential 
and incapable. As a European diplomat, described as coming from a country close to the 
United States, remarked at the time, in relation to the on-going nuclear negotiations, 
These are issues that we have to deal with security people on – in other words 
the Conservatives... The Reformists have never been in the loop on these kinds of 
things. Having Conservatives running everything may not be a reflection of  the 
will of  the Iranian public, but it will probably make our job as diplomats trying to 
deal with the people that matter much easier.7 
The ‘Conservative’ that the Europeans appeared to be getting excited over was the then head 
of  the National Security team and chief  nuclear negotiator, Hassan Rouhani. People simpli-
fied and marginalised the Khatami administration and its legacy, blaming failure on him as a 
putative victim rather than on his ill-judged and occasionally violent hardline stance. 
The Spectre of Ahmadinejad
The second set of  contested narratives related to the presidential election of  2009. The 
political fiasco that resulted from this wholly mismanaged election need not detain us 
here,8 but the violent clash between Reformists and authoritarian Conservatives was the 
most serious crisis faced by the Islamic Republic since the end of  the Iran–Iraq War and 
took over six months to suppress. It polarised society, honed competing narratives (eman-
cipation versus sedition), and left tensions and a deep political scar. This haunted the 
political establishment and made them aware of  the need to run elections that were both 
safe and popular. The trick was to find a man for all seasons; a man of  the right who could 
manage and satisfy the popular yearning for change.
7  See, ‘Iran Conservatives to Ease Engagements’, AFP, 18 February 2004. 
8  For a detailed account see Ali Ansari, Crisis of  Authority: Iran’s 10th Presidential Election, (London: RIIA, 
2010). See: also Farhad Khosrokhavar and Marie Ladier-Fouladi, ‘The 2009 Presidential Election in 
Iran: Fair or Foul?’, EUI Working Papers, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies 29 (2012).
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The Campaign
In stark contrast to the election of  2009, the presidential election of  2013 passed off 
relatively peacefully, much to the satisfaction of  the authorities and the elation of  those 
who had voted for Rouhani. What drama there was remained largely off  the streets; the 
televised debates, which had caused such controversy in 2009, now contained sufficient 
debate to keep both the public and the pundits engaged, while the turnout fulfilled the 
Supreme Leader’s promise of  a ‘political epic’. According to one news agency, the people 
were happy and the Leader satisfied and there was undoubtedly a sense of  relief  all round 
that matters had not got out of  hand.9 Yet the general sense of  satisfaction and self  con-
gratulation that followed should not disguise the fact that this election remained among 
the most controlled and opaque of  all Iranian elections, even compared to that of  2009, 
while the campaign itself, building a momentum over at least six months, was one of  the 
most dynamic ever witnessed in Iran. 
Public Scepticism
The Iranian public tend to be slow burners as far as interest in elections are concerned and 
even presidential elections don’t generate positive interest until quite late in the day. But the 
situation this time round was different. In the first place, public apathy and scepticism about 
the integrity of  the vote was considerably higher; a view reinforced by Khamenei’s asser-
tion that any talk of  ‘free elections’ was seditious and a Western plot.10 Moreover, much of 
the grass roots organisation that had been the basis of  the Green Movement in 2009 had 
been uprooted, which meant that any popular mobilisation would be difficult to achieve. 
The authorities, while anxious to secure a ‘legitimising’ high turnout were equally – if  not 
more – anxious not to be faced with a rerun of  2009. There is little doubt that the develop-
ing chaos of  the Arab Spring, and more pertinently, the extensive street protests in Turkey, 
weighed heavily on the authorities. Khamenei did in fact allude to these regional devel-
opments in one particularly bad tempered post-election exchange on the events of  2009.11
A number of  other factors also undoubtedly shaped the mood. The parlous condi-
tion of  the economy, despite receipt of  unprecedented oil revenues, was a matter of 
public anxiety and deep consternation among key members of  the elite. Indeed, the 
combination of  mismanagement, intensifying sanctions and the continuing political bra-
9  ‘The Election of  Rouhani: The People Happy, The Leader Satisfied’ [Entekhab Rouhani: Mardom 
Khosh-hal, Rahbar Razi], BBC Persian Online, 21 June 2013.
10  ‘Free Elections; The New Red Line’ [Entekhabat Azad; Khat Ghermes-e Jadeed], Radiofarda, 29 
Dey 1391 / 18 January 2013. ‘Free Elections Promote the Interests of  the West and Are the Secret of 
Sedition’ [Entekhab Azad, Donbaleh-ye Roye Gharb Ast va Ramz-e Fitneh], Rooz Online, 25 Dey 1391 
/ 14 January 2013.
11  ‘Khamenei Says Those Who Claimed Fraud during the 2009 Elections Should Apologise’, Trend News 
Agency, 29 July 2013. See also: ‘Iran’s Khamenei Lays Conditions for 2009 Protest Leaders’ Release’, 
Iran’s View, 30 July 2013. Available at: http://www.iransview.com/irans-khamenei-lays-conditions-for-
2009-protest-leaders-release/1367/ (accessed 17 October 2016).
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vado of  a president who seemed only too eager to provoke and annoy almost anyone 
who mattered, all ensured a broad coalition of  somewhat disparate allies increasingly 
determined on securing change. In this respect Ahmadinejad succeeded where almost no 
other Iranian political figure had done (except perhaps the last Shah) in uniting almost 
every significant political faction in the country against him, including key sections of  the 
hardline merchant establishment and the Revolutionary Guards.12 Indeed, widespread 
elite dissatisfaction with the status quo as represented by Ahmadinejad was critical in the 
political environment of  this election. Khamenei might ignore Reformists, centrist tech-
nocrats and traditional Conservatives, but the open criticism of  self-styled ‘Principlists’ 
was more difficult to dismiss. What made the situation even more serious is that these 
divisions appeared to extend into the Office of  the Supreme Leader itself, the very heart 
of  the autocracy. 
Hardline Divisions
Tentative polling by the authorities had suggested that former President Khatami would 
still win a landslide should he decide to run.13 If  true, it was a sad reflection not only on 
Ahmadinejad’s failure to erase the ‘heresy’ of  reform, but perhaps more pertinently on 
the subsequent failure of  the authorities to crush reform through the use of  force. More-
over Khatami appeared to be gaining support not only from ideological sympathisers such 
as Hashemi Rafsanjani, but from self  proclaimed Principlists such as Ali Motahari, son of 
Morteza Motahari, one of  the leading ideologues of  the Islamic Revolution (assassinated 
in 1979), and certainly no Liberal. Motahari had long been disaffected by the style of  poli-
tics promoted by Ahmadinejad and had made clear his view that Ahmadinejad’s handling 
of  the protests in 2009 had needlessly inflamed matters. For him, Ahmadinejad was just 
as culpable as Mir-Hossein Mousavi (if  not more so) and should as a consequence likewise 
be held accountable.14 Moreover, the belief  that Reformism (as an idea) could simply be 
eradicated was a nonsense that clearly flew in the face of  social realities.15
A prominent parliamentarian, Motahari had been scathing about parliament’s systematic 
emasculation and at one stage publicly protested it was nothing more than an extension 
of  the Leader’s Office.16 In the run up to this election, Motahari not only urged Khatami 
to run, but reportedly accused the Revolutionary Guards of  having interfered in the pre-
12  ‘Motalefeh Has Accused Ahmadinejad of  a Social Coup d’Etat’ [Motalefeh Ahmadinejad ra Mota-
hem beh Koodeta-ye Ejtemai Kard], Digarban, 14 Esfand 1391 / 14 March 2013.
13  ‘Khatami Ahead in the Electoral Polling of  the Principlists!’ [Khatami dar Sadr Nazarsanji-haye 
Entekhabati Osulgarayan!] Baztab News, 23 Bahman 1391 / 11 February 2013. The article argues that 
non-Principlist candidates are more popular than their Principlist rivals. Such polls are at best taken as 
suggestive rather than indicative.
14  ‘Ali Motahari: If  there is to be a Trial for Mousavi, Ahmadinejad Should also be Tried’, Aftab-e Yazd, 
30 August 2009.
15  See: Ali Motahari’s comments: ‘The Existence of  the Reformists is a Blessing to the Islamic Republic’ 
[Vojood Eslah Talaban Baraye Jomhuri Eslami yek Nemat Ast], Iran Labour News Agency, 7 May 2010.
16  ‘Ali Motahari: The Parliament Has Been Transformed into a Branch of  the Leader’s Office’ [Ali Motahari: 
Majlis beh Shakheh-ye Daftar Rahbari Tabdeel Shode Ast], Radiofarda, 21 Tir 1390 / 12 July 2011.
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vious year’s parliamentary elections,17 adding that if  politics continued in this manner, the 
forthcoming presidential elections would be little better than a show.18 Motahari’s pedi-
gree  – along with the consensus that he was ‘one of  us’ – undoubtedly protected him, but 
it also made his comments all the more damning. 
What Motahari’s comments revealed was that the discomfort with the political situation, 
which had hitherto been ascribed to seditionists and trouble makers, was now clearly 
making headway into the heart of  the Principlist establishment. Many were now voicing 
concerns that elections were becoming meaningless. If  the political dynamism of  street 
politics was in abeyance, it had been replaced by a far more serious rift within an elite 
increasingly anxious about the direction of  politics, the pressures on the economy and the 
realities of  the regional situation. 
There was, in short, a growing clamour for some sort of  change. 
For his part, Khatami was unsurprisingly again persuaded that discretion was the better 
part of  valour. He declined on this occasion to stand in the election, but decided nonethe-
less to campaign, publicly condemning the stultifying political atmosphere before urging 
people to seek salvation in his own mentor, Hashemi Rafsanjani.19
Building a Drama out of a Crisis
The period from Hashemi Rafsanjani’s last-minute decision to register through to his 
disqualification by the Guardian Council remains a classic example of  Iranian politi-
cal theatre. All the analyses that abound – about whether his decision was calculated or 
spontaneous, tactical or rash – remain speculative. What we do know is that his dramatic 
last-minute entrance did succeed in galvanising interest in a hitherto lacklustre election 
cycle, although the excitement generated among the political class was probably higher 
than in the electorate as a whole. 
Until then the Iranian public had been presented with a curious case of  political naval 
gazing by a handful of  Principlists seeking to outshine each other in their professed loyalty 
to the Leader. One group appeared in the forefront – the coalition of  the ‘2+1’ – largely 
on the basis that they had existed for several months with the avowed intent of  both 
17  ‘Khatami Should Become a Candidate / The Guards Interfered in the Parliamentary Elections’ 
[Khatami Candida Shaved / Sepah dar Entekhabat-e Majlis Takhalof  Kard], Melimazhabi, 8 Esfand 
1391 / 26 February 2013. Available at: http://melimazhabi.com/?p=38042 (accessed 17 October 
2016).  Motahari was in fact initially barred from running, only having the decision overturned on 
appeal: ‘Ali Motahari Dismisses the Reasons He Has Been Barred’ [Ali Motahari Dalayel Rad Salahi-
yatesh ra Rad Kard], BBC Persian Online, 14 January 2012.
18  ‘Motahari: With the Current State of  Politics and the Absence of  Critics, the Elections Will Be a 
Show’ [Motahari: ba Edameh-ye Siyasatha-ye Feli va Gheybat Montaghedan, Entekhabat Farmayeshi 
Meshavad], Baztab-e Emrooz, 23 Esfand 1391 / 13 March 2013.
19  ‘Seyyed Mohammad Khatami: With This Atmosphere, if  the Prophet of  God Came, Difficulties 
Would Not Be Solved’ [Seyyed Mohammad Khatami: Bah een Royeha agar Peghambar-e Khoda ham 
Biyayad Moshkelat hal Nemishavad], Kaleme, 2 Ordibehesht 1392 / 22 April 2013.
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formulating a strategy and picking a candidate to champion the Principlist cause in the 
forthcoming election. These three individuals were former speaker of  parliament, Ghol-
am-Ali Haddad-Adel; Mayor of  Tehran, Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf; and advisor to the 
Leader on Foreign Policy and former Foreign Minister, Ali Akbar Velayati. All three had 
close ties to the Supreme Leader’s Office and one (Haddad-Adel) had familial relations, 
with his daughter married to Khamenei’s second son, Mojtaba. If  this ‘coalition’ was 
intended to excite public opinion or present itself  as some sort of  substitute political party, 
then it fell flat on both counts. What disagreements did exist between the three individ-
uals were just not dramatic enough for an electorate that simply did not care about the 
nuances of  Principlist ideology, or even, perhaps more pertinently, about the egos of  the 
various candidates. 
In retrospect, this internecine competition appeared dangerously complacent,20 but it 
also reflected what many felt, that this was what politics in the Islamic Republic now 
entailed: a competition between different Principlists arguing over who could better exe-
cute the ideology of  the State as defined by the Supreme Leader. Indeed, in the absence 
of  anything approaching political parties – the organisations underpinning the Reform 
movement,and its offspring the Green Movement having been ruthlessly supressed – 
the contest was fast resembling a political beauty contest among Principlists loyal to the 
Leader. One of  the most striking examples of  this came from the Principlist candidate, 
Saeed-Reza Jalili, the chief  nuclear negotiator who had not joined the coalition but was 
generally regarded as the Leader’s anointed candidate. Jalili clearly relished his position as 
front runner and repaid the Leader’s apparent blessing in kind by making the astonishing 
gesture of  swearing on the Holy Qurʾan – albeit after being asked to do so – that he would 
be happy to sacrifice his life for the Leader.21 
It should come as no surprise therefore that Rafsanjani’s abrupt entry into the race pro-
vided something of  a jolt to a body politic approaching rigor mortis. While the public 
remained sceptical, political commentators came alive, hailing Rafsanjani as the one 
man capable of  restoring life and dignity to Iranian politics. As the self-styled ‘General 
of  Reconstruction’ who had ostensibly rebuilt the country after the devastating eight-
year war with Iraq, Rafsanjani was just the man to bring some sanity back to economic 
policy. What is perhaps most striking about Rafsanjani’s late registration was the range 
of  support he appeared to garner.22 One noted Reformist journalist somewhat euphor-
20  Hossein Shariatmadari, ‘Don’t Stand in the Way of  the Flood’ [Mane’ ye Seyl Nashavid], Keyhan, 23 
Khordad 1392 / 13 June 2013, p.1.
21  Manuchehr Lenziran, ‘Saeid Jalili Swear to Qurʾan in Tehran University to Sacrifice his Life for 
Khamenei!’, YouTube, 3 June 2013. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_ZUyaL1wfyQ 
(accessed 17 October 2016). For a detailed account of  Jalili’s views and how they mirrored those of  the 
Leader see: ‘What Will Be Left of  Iran with a Jalili Presidency?’ [Ba Rais Jomhur Shodan Jalili Cheh az 
Iran Baghi Mimanad?], Radiofarda, 3 Khordad 1392 / 24 May 2013. Velayati was also extraordinarily 
deferential to the Leader: see: ‘Ali Akbar Velayati: President-Permission Sir’ [Akbar Ganji Ali Akbar 
Velyatai: Rais Jomhur-e Agha Ejaze’], Radiozamaneh, 31 Farvardin 1392 / 20 April 2013.
22  ‘A Student of  Ayatollah Misbah [Yazdi]: Qom is also with Hashemi’ [Shagerd-e Ayatollah Misbah: 
Qom ham ba Hashemi Ast], Entekhab,  25 Ordibehesht 1392 / 15 May 2013.
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ically argued that Rafsanjani’s election would erase the stain of  the last eight years and 
effectively reboot the Islamic Republic, adding for good measure that he now preferred 
Rafsanjani over Khatami, because the country’s problems were fundamentally economic 
in nature.23 
Rafsanjani was joined by one other late entry – considerably less surprising but still of 
interest: Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei, Ahmadinejad’s chosen successor, who had been 
effectively campaigning for the better part of  two years and was the source of  much of 
the difficulty between the Supreme Leader and his one time protégé. Given Khame-
nei’s dislike of  Mashaei, few believed he would be allowed to run. There was however 
some excitement about the possibility of  Ahmadinejad trying to force the Leader’s hand 
through fair means or foul, and a good deal of  polite interest in Ahmadinejad’s (and 
Mashaei’s) sudden discovery of  the rule of  law and civil rights (mixed as always with a 
heavy dose of  nationalism), to say nothing of  the less than subtle assertion that a Mashaei 
presidency would inaugurate an Iranian Spring.24 
The Election Process
Well over 600 potential candidates registered for the election and prepared themselves for 
vetting by the austere and wholly unaccountable Guardian Council. Led by the hardline 
Ayatollah Jannati, most of  its twelve appointees were there by the grace of  the Supreme 
Leader (six are appointed by the Leader, and the other six by parliament, but given the 
monochrome nature of  parliament, they were unlikely to nominate anyone who might 
offend the Leader’s sensibilities). 
The vetting procedure itself  is among the most opaque processes of  any election cycle. 
Iranian presidential elections always draw high numbers of  candidates from the serious, 
to the well-intentioned, down to the outright bizarre, and while the numbers are often 
used to show how vibrant political life is, in reality they reflect the complete lack of  struc-
ture in Iranian politics. The majority of  candidates can therefore be easily dismissed. 
There are no parties through which candidates emerge. Instead, nominees come forward 
and then seek the endorsement of  various factions and groups. In many cases a candidate 
will appear on several different lists, remaining ambiguous or even contradicting themselves 
depending on what audience is being addressed. It is therefore often better to talk of  politi-
cal tendencies rather than ideological platforms, although some candidates will clearly lean 
towards a particular stance or be characterised as belonging to one faction or another. 
23   ‘The Destiny of  Iran Has Fallen to the Last Chapter of  Rafsanjani’s Political Life’, [Sarnevesht ‘Iran’ 
beh Akharin Fasl Zendegiye Siyasi-ye Hashemi Kare Khorde Ast], Asr-e Iran, 22 Ordibehesht 1392 / 
12 May 2013.
24  ‘Mashaei: General Plans No Longer Answer in the Name of  Islam / Ladies and Gentlemen, We Are 
All Soldiers in the Spring of  the Hidden Imam’ [Mashaei: Digar Tarh Koleati beh Name Islam Javab 
Nemidahad / Aghayan va Khanomha-ye Bahari dar Maktab Emam Asr Hame Sarbaz And], Mehr 
News Agency, 11 Ordibehesht 1392 / 1 May 2013.
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The first criterion of  electability is loyalty to the Leader – which can be a poisoned chalice 
inasmuch as loyalty will get you through the vetting but rarely garners votes. Rafsanjani, 
whose relationship with the Leader had been strained since his ambivalent stance on the 
crisis of  2009, professed as much loyalty as his dignity could permit, even going so far as 
to suggest that he has asked and received permission to run. His supporters, meanwhile, 
sought to turn the question back onto the Leader, asking how it might be possible that he 
opposes the candidacy of  such an esteemed servant of  the Revolution.25 Mashaei on the 
other hand went out of  his way to be obsequious.26
In the event, it did neither of  them much good. Ayatollah Khamenei urged the Guardian 
Council to work wisely as they always had done, and it was duly announced that both 
candidates had been disqualified, leaving six avowed Principlists (of  various shades), one 
Reformist, and Hassan Rouhani.
The Diplomatic Sheikh27
While Hassan Rouhani was not an unknown personality, his politics remained opaque. 
He had been at the heart of  the security establishment for the better part of  two decades 
and was even one the few individuals entrusted with engaging with the ill-fated visit of 
Robert McFarlane in 1986.28 He was generally understood to be a Conservative but, 
like all political appellations in Iran, what this meant depended very much on context. 
During the Reform administration of  Mohammad Khatami, his tenure as Secretary of 
the National Security Council saw him firmly defined as a staunch, if  not hardline, Con-
servative. But then during the election campaign he became anxious to redefine himself 
as altogether more moderate. When his Conservative reputation came back to haunt him 
he was swift to clarify his position on the student demonstrations of  1999. In a memorable 
and decisive riposte to Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf ’s assertions, Rouhani stated that he 
was a jurist not a colonel.29 
25  ‘Why Should the Supreme Leader be Opposed?! In his own Words, no one can Approach Hash-
emi’ [Chera Rahbar Moazam Mokhalef  Shaved?! Beh Gofte-ye Eshan Hich Kas Bar Ishan Hashemi 
Nemishavad], Khatami, 17 Ordibehesht 1392 / 7 May 2013.
26  ‘No Equivalent to the Supreme Leader Exists in the World’ [Hamanand Maqam Moazam Rahbaru 
dar Donya Vojud Nadarad], Namna, 29 Ordibehesht 1392 / 19 May 2013.
27  Rouhani was given this epithet ostensibly because of  his diplomatic expertise. It carried no religious 
connotations, see: ‘Iran’s Next President Called ‘Diplomatic Sheik’ [sic] by Supporters’, Los Angeles 
Times, 15 June 2015.
28  Thomas Erdbrink, ‘President-Elect Stirs Optimism in Iran and West’, New York Times, 26 July 2013. 
Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/27/world/middleeast/president-elect-stirs-opti-
mism-in-iran-and-west.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (accessed 18 October 2016).
29  The allegation was made by Qalibaf  in one of  the debates eliciting a strong response: Manuchehr 
Lenziran, ‘Dispute between Hassan Rohani and Bagher Ghalibaf  about 18 Tir during Last Year 
Campaign’, YouTube, 10 July 2014. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9lICWSNagmQ 
(accessed 30 October 2016). Former Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps commander Safavi was later 
happy to clarify Rouhani’s role in the student demonstrations of  1999: ‘The Recollection of  Com-
mander Safavi on Rouhani’s Role in the Events of  18 Tir’ [Ravayet-e Sardar Safavi az Naqsh Rouhani 
dar Havades 18 Tir], Khodnevis, 11 Mordad 1392 / 2 August 2013.
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While Rouhani’s somewhat abrupt conversion to the tenants of  Reformism most obvi-
ously associated with Mohammad Khatami did take many observers by surprise, shifts 
in political emphasis are not unusual in a political environment that has few institutional 
reference points and no parties. If  Rouhani was a Conservative in relation to Khatami, he 
was certainly a moderate compared to Ahmadinejad, under whose tenure the politics of 
Iran had shifted so far to the right that most traditional Conservatives felt adrift. Indeed, 
Rouhani’s effective realignment had been in train for some time and was in part a reaction 
to continued attacks on his tenure and achievements as nuclear negotiator by Ahmadine-
jad and his supporters. This had previously resulted in a lengthy memoir entitled National 
Security and Nuclear Diplomacy (whose first edition was deemed too revealing for the censors 
and resulted in cuts to subsequent editions), which introduced the hitherto discrete cleric 
as a pragmatic operator hindered as much by incoherence at home as by duplicity abroad. 
Rouhani’s decision to register as a candidate sparked modest interest, partly because, as 
already noted, his politics were not entirely clear. He had not positioned himself  as the 
Reformist candidate, a slot reserved for one of  Khatami’s former Vice Presidents, Moham-
mad Reza Aref, and his candidacy, along with that of  Aref, was generally regarded as 
tokenistic, intended to convey an aura of  competition to a much disillusioned public and 
to sceptical foreign observers. Any early excitement attached to Rouhani was not directed 
at him but at his mentor, Hashemi Rafsanjani.30 With the latter’s disqualification, the field 
seemed ready for yet another ‘engineered’ victory for the Principlists, although exactly 
which one might top the list was a matter of  some vexed excitement among the hardline 
press, with some commentators noting that Khamenei really wanted a Velayati–Qalibaf 
win, and the ever confident Fars News pronouncing an ‘epic’ turnout (with a remarkably 
accurate prediction of  72 percent) with Jalili and Qalibaf  in the lead.31
Outside this hallowed circle of  Loyalist-Principlists, there was considerable anger at Raf-
sanjani’s disqualification, especially when it was suggested that the Guardian Council had 
made its decision on the basis of  Rafsanjani being too old. Ali Motahari, who had since 
become the Rafsanjani campaign spokesperson, was sufficiently incensed by the impend-
ing disqualification that he angrily denounced the deception taking place, noting that 
the people had been deceived once before, and enough was enough.32 In the immediate 
aftermath of  the disqualification he added for good measure that had the Founder of  the 
30  Hassan Rouhani, ‘Rouhani’s View on the House Arrest of  Mousavi & Karroubi w/ English Sub-
titles’, YouTube, 29 May 2013. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hYwM4Na1HIQ 
(accessed 18 October 2016).
31  ‘The Plan of  the Supreme Leader’s Office is for a President Velayati with Qalibaf  as First Deputy’ 
[Barnameye Beit Rahbari Riyasat Jomhuri Velayati va Moaven Avali Qalibaf  Ast], Digarban, 24 Ordibe-
hesht 1392 / 14 May 2013. ‘Qalibaf  and Jalili in the Lead / Participation in South Khorasan Province 
Reaches 91%’ [Qalibaf  va Jalili Dar Sadr / Mosharekat dar Khorasan Jonubi beh 91% dar Sad Resid], 
Fars News, 13 Khordad 1392 / 3 June 2013.
32  ‘In the Last Election We Deceived the People, Enough’ [Dar Entekhabat Gozashteh Mardom ra 
Fareeb Dadeem, Digar Bas Ast], Kaleme, 28 Ordibehesht 1392 / 18 May 2013.
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Islamic Republic stood, he too would have found himself  disbarred.33 The establishment, 
for its part, appears to have calculated that in disbarring both Mashaei and Rafsanjani 
they could argue that one had been sacrificed to prevent the other from running. But 
perhaps more important was their assessment that the disqualification would result in no 
street protests – something for which they had prepared, with the security forces warned 
of  the re-emergence of  ‘sedition’ on an even grander scale than 2009 (a trope that reap-
peared with some vigour for the 2016 Majlis elections).34 
In the event, the establishment breathed a sigh of  relief  and congratulated itself  on its 
careful management. Not only did protests not happen but Ahmadinejad’s much-vaunted 
threat to unleash his ‘supporters’ also failed to materialise.35 The most intriguing revela-
tion was the reported existence of  a tape in which Ahmadinejad confessed that election 
fraud had been imposed on him against his will in 2009. The number of  votes he had 
acquired was remarkably close to a figure previously stated by one of  his aides.36 What-
ever the veracity of  the report, the website in question was immediately banned and 
Ahmadinejad’s Office quickly denied the existence of  any tape.37 For many, the report 
simply confirmed what they already suspected and Ahmadinejad’s denial was regarded 
as a tactical retreat in an effort not to antagonise the Guardian Council. Yet, even after 
Mashaei’s disqualification, Ahmadinejad proved unusually tight-lipped, opting instead to 
appeal to the Leader. Rafsanjani meanwhile opted for the moral high ground with a 
statesmanlike stoicism which pushed him further into the category of  ‘political martyr’. 
As Motahari’s comments revealed, the ‘disenfranchised’ elite was proving a hard nut to 
crack. What determined the decision to regroup around Rouhani is difficult to discern. 
Post-facto analyses always tend to see more method in the madness than may have existed 
in the chaos of  the political process. In Iran, perhaps more than elsewhere, calculation is 
33  ‘Motahari: If  Ayatollah Khomeini Had Registered, He Too Would Have Been Disqualified’ 
[Motahari: Ayatollah Khomeini Agar Sabt Nam Mikard, Rad Salahiyat Meshod], Radiofarda, 1 Khor-
dad 1392 / 22 May 2013.
34  ‘The Head of  the IRGC Political Office: The Likelihood of  Riots on the Russian Model’ [Rais 
Daftar Siyasi Sepah: Ehtemal Voghuh Shoresh-haye Model Rusi], Radiofarda, 28 Ordibehesht 1392 / 18 
May 2013. ‘The Flag of  Sedition in the Hands of  the Deviant Current / The People of  the West do not 
Accept the Zionist Regime’ [Parcham Fetneh Emrooz dar Dast Jaryan Enherafi Ast / Mardom Gharb 
Regime Zionisti ra Ghabol Nadarand], Fars News, 6 Ordibehesht 1392 / 26 April 2013.
35  ‘An Eventful Evening for Taking a Step towards Creating Mr Khamenei’s Political Epic’ [Shabi Por 
Hadese Baraye Gami be Jelo dar Jahat Sakhtan Hameseh Siyasi Agahiye Khamenei], Rangin-kaman, 31 
Ordibehesht 1392 / 21 May 2013. ‘Tehran on the Night of  the Announcement of  the Disqualified’ 
[Tehran dar Shab Elam Esami bee Salahiyat ha], Rooz Online, 31 Ordibhesht 1392 / 21 May 2013.
36  ‘The Curious Revelations in the Speech of  an Ahmadinejad Supporter’ [Ramzgeshayi az Sokhan-
rani yek Tarafdar Ahmadi Nejad], Rahesabz, 23 November 2009. 
37  ‘Why Did Ahmadinejad’s Office Deny the Tape?’ [Chera Daftar Ahmadinejad Navar ra Takzib 
Kard?] Rooz Online, 12 Ordibehesht 1392 / 2 May 2013. ‘The Suspension of  the Baztab’s Activities 
following the Publication of  Documents Pertaining to Fraud in the Election of  2009’ [Toghif  Faaliyat 
‘Baztab’ dar Pey Enteshar Khabari az Asnad Taghalob dar Entekhabat-e 88], Kaleme, 10 Ordibehesht 
1392 / 30 April 2013. ‘The Office of  the Iranian Presidency Denies Any Knowledge of  Election Fraud’ 
[Daftar-e Rais Jomhuri Iran Agahi u az ‘Taghalob-e Entekhabati’ ra Takzib Kard], BBC Persian Online, 
30 April 2013.
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always mixed with a heavy dose of  opportunism and whether the momentum came from 
below or was directed from above, it is highly unlikely, after 4 years of  the most severe 
repression, that the popular mood would have gained any traction at all, had a fractured 
political elite not been receptive. But discomfort in 2009 had translated into anger in 2013 
at continuous political marginalisation (to say nothing of  the insults that had been heaped 
upon them by Ahmadinejad and his allies) and became a real anxiety over the worsening 
economic crisis facing the country. 
This mixture of  anger and anxiety was undoubtedly encouraged by the embers of  dis-
content that continued to express themselves among key sectors of  the population, most 
obviously students who chafed under the oppressive atmosphere. There were indeed some 
early indications that the popular mood of  discontent and anxiety could once again be 
whipped into a political movement, not only in Rouhani’s early engagement with stu-
dent groups,38 but most strikingly at the funeral of  a leading Reformist cleric, Ayatollah 
Taheri, in Isfahan, when crowds chanted slogans demanding the release of  Mir-Hossein 
Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi.39 Indeed, the dominant themes of  these meetings and the 
subsequent rallies were the issue of  electoral fraud, the oppressive political atmosphere 
and the particular fate of  Mousavi and Karroubi.40 The events of  2009 were constantly in 
people’s minds, both on the streets and among the elites.
At the same time, it was palpably clear that for such latent discontent to be effectively 
driven to the polls, a much greater effort would have to be made to overcome engrained 
popular scepticism. Two developments were necessary: unity among key elements of  the 
elite and the promise of  dramatic change. 
The first step was to foster a new progressive alliance bringing together the Centrists (Raf-
sanjani) and the Reformists (Khatami). Having earlier admonished the electorate not to 
disengage from the political process, Khatami decided, along with Rafsanjani, to throw 
his weight behind Rouhani’s candidacy in a bid to consolidate the opposition to the Prin-
ciplists. Between them they attracted extensive support from the wider bureaucracy and 
from students and activists. Khatami’s support was to prove critical in two ways: first in 
38  Hassan Rouhani, ‘Rouhani’s View on the Popular Protests after 2009 Elections w/ English Subti-
tles’, YouTube, 6 May 2013. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n0CluzrbPJk (accessed 
19 October 2016). 
39  2009 Iranian Revolution, ‘“Mousavi & Karoubi Must Be Freed” Protests at Funeral of  Ayt. Taheri’, 
YouTube, 4 June 2013. Available at:  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iMoXCOvN2n8 (accessed 19 
October 2016). 
40  Golbarg Bashi, ‘Speech of  Hassan Rouhani in Mashhad Presidential Rally (12 June 2013)’, [Sokha-
nrani Hassan Rouhani dar Hamayesh Entikhabati Mashhad (22 Khordad 92)], YouTube, 12 June 2013. 
Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qqj5i40jsf0 (accessed 19 October 2016). Bahman 
Kalbasi, ‘Mashhad – 12 June – Speech of  Rouhani’ [Mashhad – 22 Khordad – Sokhanrani Rou-
hani], YouTube, 12 June 2013. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yble-i9Tx-c (accessed 
19 October 2016). Sitad Salam, ‘“If  there is Fraud, there will be an Uprising in Iran, Beheshti Stadium 
Mashhad, 12 June 2013”’ [“Age Taghalob Bashe, Iran Qiyamat Mishe” Varzeshgah Beheshti Mashhad, 
22 Khordad 1392], YouTube, 12 June 2013. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GFGmz-
JwPqmw (accessed 19 October 2016). 
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ensuring the withdrawal of  the Reformist candidate, Aref, and secondly in convincing a 
sceptical public to participate. Having previously noted that his precondition for partici-
pation was the release of  political prisoners, Khatami now made the case that a Rouhani 
victory would create the best opportunity for that release to happen, adding that the polit-
ical prisoners themselves supported this move.
For his part, Rouhani played his role almost to perfection, careful not to antagonise any 
of  the key constituents, be they from the left or the right of  the political spectrum. His 
promises grew increasingly dramatic and there is little doubt that he grew into his role as 
the torchbearer for reform.41 His assured performances in the televised debates, which, 
despite a lacklustre start (largely due to the curious quiz show format devised by state 
television), grew increasingly confident, and only served to cement his credentials as a 
thoughtful practitioner.42 This contrasted favourably with the poor performances of  his 
rivals, especially Jalili, whose intellectual incoherence elicited the popular joke that Irani-
ans could finally empathise with Catherine Ashton’s pain.43
While momentum did build into a popular crescendo on 14 June, the post-election elation 
at Rouhani’s first-round victory has tended to disguise the final part of  the equation that 
had to be carefully managed, which was the hardline establishment itself, principally but 
not limited to Khamenei, who were by no means reconciled to a Rouhani victory won 
on the back of  slogans they assumed were confined to the dustbin of  history. Rouhani 
sought to anticipate these problems by writing a private letter to the Leader to assure 
him of  his fidelity to both him and the Revolution.44 But even then, in the days leading 
up to the vote, there were suggestions by the Guardian Council that the qualifications 
of  candidates could be reviewed, and it subsequently transpired that the Minister of  the 
Interior, charged with administering the elections, had come under intense pressure from 
the Guardian Council, who had indicated they were keen to have Rouhani disqualified.45 
41  ‘70 Key Statements Rouhani Must Not Forget’ [70 Jomleh-ye Kelidi keh Rouhani Nabayad Fara-
mush Konad], Iran Emrooz, 11 July 2013.
42  ‘The Electoral Debates’ [Manzereh Entekhabati], Babakdad, 10 Khordad 1392 / 31 May 2013. ‘IRIB 
Transformed the Most Important Political Event into an Entertainment’ [Seda va Sima Mohemtarin 
Etefagh Siyasi ra be yek Barnameye Sargarm Konande Tabdil Kard] Etemad, 11 Khordad 1392 / 1 
June 2013.
43  ‘The People and the Televisual Presence of  Veleyati, Jalili and Rouhani’ [Mardom va Hozur-e Tele-
vision-e Velayati, Jalili va Rouhani], Peyknet, 7 Khordad 1392 / 28 May 2013.
44  ‘Bahonar: Rouhani Sent a Letter to the Leader One Week before the Election’ [Bahonar: Rouhani 
yek Hafteh Pish az Entekhabat beh Rahbari Nameh Nevesht], Radiofarda, 2 Tir 1392 / 23 June 2013. 
See also: Fars News, 8 Khordad 1392 / 29 May 2013.
45  ‘The Minister of  the Interior Was in the Last Hours Put Under Immense Pressure’  [Vazir Keshvar 
dar Sa’at Akhar beh Shedat zir Feshar Bud!], Rahdigar, 8 Tir 1392 / 29 June 2013.
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Election Day
Past experience suggested to many that there was nothing certain about a Rouhani vic-
tory. A high turnout was not guaranteed even with all the assurances and promises to the 
electorate, and even Rouhani’s most ardent supporters felt the best they could expect was 
a second-round contest. The Principlist strategy seems to have been to achieve just this, 
after which a unified hardline candidate would sweep up the votes. Moreover, anxieties 
remained concerning the position Khamenei would take. 
A Fractured Elite 
In the run-up to the vote, only Ali Akbar Nateq-Nouri, a traditional Conservative with 
few moderate strings to his bow, had been confident of  a first-round win for Rouhani as he 
went to cast his vote. Nateq-Nouri’s certainty was the first clear indication that the mood in 
the Leader’s Office had changed, and that, given a high turnout and no prospect of  state 
interference, Rouhani’s platform would be secure. Once seen as a likely successor to Hash-
emi Rafsanjani, Nateq-Nouri had famously been defeated in Khatami’s landslide election 
victory in 1997, among the first of  the Leader’s preferred candidates to suffer humiliation 
at the hands of  the electorate. He had since sought succour and gainful employment in 
the Supreme Leader’s Office where he established his credentials as a shrewd purveyor of 
the political scene – a reputation in part earned by the fact that he kept himself  well out 
of  the limelight. Over time, his dislike of  the politics of  Ahmadinejad grew stronger than 
his objections to Reformism, and he was further incensed by Ahmadinejad’s accusation in 
2009 that he and his family were involved in financial corruption.46 Like many others, he 
had some personal scores to settle, but was also emblematic of  a deeply concerned elite. 
It can be surmised that, subject to assurances about his own position, Khamenei had 
finally recognised the urgency of  the situation, faced as he was by an elite rebellion of 
unprecedented reach and no doubt realising that people throughout the region, from 
Egypt through to Turkey, were in a turbulent mood. There are two indications that this 
was indeed the case. In the days leading to the vote, Khamenei made an unprecedented 
appeal to the electorate to come out and vote, discarding his usual bombast to appeal to 
voters to vote for the honour of  their country, even if  they did not believe in the regime.47 
This was an extraordinary exercise in outreach which did not go unnoticed and reflected 
the deep anxiety Khamenei must have felt – anxiety which came in part from the real-
isation that observers both within and, perhaps more importantly, outside the country, 
had long dismissed the election as little more than political theatre. Casting his ballot, 
Khamenei made a remarkable comment which revealed just how affected he had become 
by the criticism, notifying his American critics in particular – in distinctly undiplomatic 
46  Robert Tait, ‘Iran’s Supreme Leader Blasts Ahmadinejad for Corruption Claims’, The Guardian, 4 June 
2009. Available at: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jun/04/ahmadinejad-debate-backlash 
(accessed 19 October 2016).
47  Manuchehr Lenziran, ‘Ayatollah Khamenei Call Opponents of  Islamic Repulic to Vote!’, YouTube, 14 
June 2013. Available at:   http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6RRv2f5yr4I (accessed 19 October 2016).
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language – that they could effectively ‘go to hell’.48 Less colourfully, and consequently less 
noticed by those overseas, was his pointed remark that no one, not even members of  his 
family knew his voting intentions. Whether this was intentional or not, it was taken by a 
number of  domestic observers to indicate that his son Mojtaba, the bête noire of  Iranian 
electoral politics was neither privy to nor influencing his decisions.
The Result
The result was of  course a dramatic victory in the first-round, with a turnout that satisfied 
the Leader’s demand for a ‘political epic’. Compared to 2009, the votes took considerable 
time to count, with the Ministry of  the Interior formally announcing the results late after-
noon the following day. One of  the problems for observers was a lack of  clarity over the 
precise number of  votes needed by Rouhani to surpass the 50 percent mark, with some 
discussion over whether this meant 50 percent (plus one vote) of  the entire eligible voters 
or simply of  those who had voted. When it was confirmed that it was the latter figure 
that mattered there was then the question – in the absence of  any electoral register – of 
knowing how many people had actually voted. The figure of  72 percent that was even-
tually released was of  course entirely in line with the figure predicted by Fars News some 
time before and, the truth is, in the absence of  any objective means of  assessment (and 
the paucity of  foreign journalists in stark contrast to 2009), there is no way of  verifying 
the figures. We do know that, unlike 2009, there was no attempt to present the process 
of  counting as one that was heavily computerised, and the announcement of  the results, 
though perhaps a few hours slower, was broadly in line with the announcement of  results 
in elections before 2009. 
The extended process on this occasion was put down to several factors, the most popular 
being that the Ministry of  Interior was actually counting the votes this time round. But 
alternatives included the suggestion that the Ministry did not want to announce too early 
in the day so as to preempt and prevent celebrations (not entirely credible given that cele-
brations took place later that evening). The more probable suggestion was that last-minute 
fine tuning of  the figures was taking place to reduce Rouhani’s margin of  victory, so as 
to not humiliate the Principlist candidates. There was some precedence for this in 1997, 
when it was widely believed that Khatami’s staggering landslide had a few million votes 
shaved off  and added to Nateq-Nouri’s paltry total. The margin of  victory was both 
significant enough to ensure a first-round victory, and marginal enough to encourage 
the view that Iran’s electorate was diverse and that Rouhani’s mandate was limited. It 
also ensured of  course that Khamenei’s position as final arbiter between the factions was 
assured.
48  ‘Iran Chooses Replacement for Mahmoud Ahmadinejad: Ayatollah Khamenei Casts His Vote, Telling 
the US “The Hell with You”’, The Independent, 14 June 2013. For the full comment see: Manuchehr Lenziran, 
‘Ayatollah Khamenei Cast His Vote and React to USA: The Hell They Don’t Accept!’, YouTube, 13 June 
2013. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQ92phPOTyg (accessed 19 October 2016).
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The immediate victor in this election was in many ways Khamenei himself. For all his 
anxieties, the electorate had delivered a healthy turnout, which had served to heal the 
scars of  2009. No one had complained and no one had protested. Indeed, the fact that 
the small margin of  victory – albeit in the first-round – had not elicited any protests from 
the Principlists suggested that they were both more politically mature and lawful than 
Mousavi’s supporters. Popular elation and elite relief  testified to a country slowly awaken-
ing from a nightmare, and an extraordinary exercise in retrospective rationalisation took 
effect almost immediately. Khamenei, who was immediately shielded from any respon-
sibility for the previous eight years was ‘thanked’ by almost everyone on the political 
spectrum (including former President Khatami) for having managed the ‘political epic’ 
with such finesse, with perhaps the most ironic chants of  ‘Dictator, Dictator, Thank-you, 
Thank-you’ coming from a populace elated that he had chosen not to interfere after all.49 
The corollary of  that of  course was to heap all responsibility for the past eight years onto 
the ‘deviant current’, and the personality of  Ahmadinejad in particular, as Loyalists sud-
denly found themselves on the wrong side of  the curve and swiftly moved to disavow him. 
One even went so far as to protest that he had been ‘forced’ to support Ahmadinejad.50 
The other major exercise in the historical settling of  scores was the insistence that the 
epic of  2013 had effectively proved all those protestors in 2009 wrong. 51 Rouhani, who 
had been more circumspect in the campaign, now spoke of  the protestors in derogatory 
terms, and added for good measure that the political slate had been wiped clean.52 Others, 
including Khamenei himself, were more forceful, demanding an apology from his critics, 
encouraging his supporters to go further in urging repentance or the prosecution of  all 
49  ‘What Days Four Years Ago: Participation in Elections, 1392: Continuing the Popular Movement 
of  1388 or against it? In Favour or not?’ [Chahar Sal Pish Cheneen Rouzha-ye: Sharkat dar Entekha-
bat 1392: Dar Emtedad Harekat-haye Mardomi Sal-e 1388 ya Aleye An?], Zamaneh, 6 Tir 1392 / 
27 June 2013. Available at: http://www.radiozamaneh.com/79571#.Uj7GmBZQXA5 (accessed 19 
October 2016). ‘Iran Updates: Khatami Thanked the Supreme Leader, Rowhani Vowed to Empower 
the Islamic Republic’, Iran’s View, 23 June 2013. Available at: http://www.iransview.com/iran-up-
dates-khatami-thanked-the-supreme-leader-rowhani-vowed-to-empower-the-islamic-republic/1176/ 
(accessed 20 October 2016). ‘Rouhani on Television: I Hold the Hands of  All Moderates, Reformists 
and Principlists Warmly / A Special Humble Thanks to the Leader of  the Revolution’ [Rouhani dar 
Television: Dast ham Etedalgarayan, Eslahtalabn va Osulgarayan rah be Garmi Miferasham / Sepas 
Vije Manarzani Rahbar Enqelab Bad], Entekhab, 25 Khordad 1392 / 15 June 2013.
50  ‘Kochakzadeh: We Were Forced to Support Ahmadinejad’ [Kochakzadeh: Majbur Shodeem az 
Ahmadinejad Hemayat Koneem], Fararu News, 7 Tir 1392 / 28 June 2013.
51  ‘The Election of  2013 has sent those who Claimed Fraud in 2009 to the Grave’ [Entekhab 92 Edaye 
Taqalob dar Entekhabat 88 ra be Gorestan Sepord], Digarban, 28 Khordad 1392 / 18 June 2013. One 
of  the most curious exercises in this respect was the interview with Saeed Hajjarian in which he stated 
categorically that there had been no fraud – a phrase that made the headline – but added that there had 
been a ‘systematic duping’: ‘There Was No Fraud in 2009 / It Will Be Difficult for Rouhani to Keep his 
Votes / I Read Kayhan Everyday’ [Dar Entekhabat 88 Taqalob Nashod / Hefz ara Baraye Rouhani 
Kare Sakhti Ast / Har Rooz Keyhan ra Mikhonam], Tasnim News, 20 Mordad 1392 / 11 August 2013.
52  ‘Rouhani with his Congratulations has Denied there was Fraud in the Elections, the Protests of  2009 
were only Street Camping’ [Rouhani ba Tabrik beh Monker Taghalob dar Entekhabat, Eterazhaye 
Sal 88 ra Ordukeshi Khiabani Khand], Digarban 24 Mordad 1392 / 15 August 2013. ‘Rouhani: The 
Spectres of  the Election of  2009 Have Been Removed’ [Rouhani: Shebahat Dar Bareye Entekhabat 88 
Shosteh Shod], Enghelab Eslami, 20 Shahrivar 1392 / 11 September 2013.
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leaders of  ‘sedition’ – including, it might be added, former President Khatami, who Rou-
hani first thanked, and then, deciding that discretion was the better part of  valour, moved 
to distance himself  from, such that he declined to invite him to his inauguration.53 
Despite being a government elected on a popular mandate of  ‘reform’, it quickly dis-
owned the Reformist administration of  Mohammad Khatami as its political progenitor, 
and publicly portrayed it as ‘extremist’, similar to that of  Ahmadinejad. Right wing com-
mentators were especially keen to emphasise this, in part to justify their own support of 
Rouhani, but also to dampen some of  the momentum for change that had once again 
been unleashed.54 Even Khatami was keen to contain expectations, fearful no doubt that 
popular momentum would undo Rouhani’s presidency, just as, he would have argued, it 
had undone him a decade earlier.55 But if  anyone could be counted on to dampen the 
popular enthusiasm it was the hardline editor of  Kayhan newspaper, Hossein Shahriat-
madari, who in a biting editorial made it clear that Rouhani was ‘one of  us’ and that 
those who hankered after substantive change were likely to be disappointed.56 Khamenei, 
for his part, soon backtracked on his ‘national’ call to arms when days after the vote he 
pointed out that all those who voted, even those who in his own words did not believe in 
the system, did by their actions, trust in the political order that is the Islamic Republic.57
53  For Khamenei’s ill-tempered comments see: Manuchehr Lenziran, ‘Ayatollah Khamenei: Why 
Mousavi and Karoubi Do Not Apologize!’, YouTube, 29 July 2013. Available at: http://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=fcL1Z-s2wjQ (accessed 20 October 2016). Reformists were quick to respond: ‘Tajzadeh: 
Those Who Need to Apologise to the Nation Are Those Who Have Brought Iran to this Deplor-
able Situation’ [Tajzadeh: Kesani Bayad az Melat ozr Bekhahand ke Iran Rea beh een Vaziat Esfenak 
Keshandehand], Sahanews, 5 August 2013. ‘Hossein Shariatmadari’s Attack: Why Did You Thank Kha-
tami?’ [Hamle-ye Hossein Shariatmadari beh Rouhani: Chera az Khatami Tashakor Kardi?] Asr-Iran 
Online, 10 Tir 1392 / 1 July 2013. ‘Asgarowladi: Mousavi and Karroubi Should Repent this Month’ 
[Asgarowladi: Mousavi va Karubi Dare Een Mah Tobeh Konand], Sahamnews, 12 July 2013. ‘Keyhan: 
Time to Prosecute the Leaders of  Sedition’ [Keyhan: Vaght Mohakemeh-ye Saran Fitneh Ast], Entekhab, 
29 Khordad 1392 / 19 June 2013.
54  ‘Rafighdoust: The Style of  Rouhani’s Politics is nothing like Khatami / Ahmadinejad Won’t Remain 
in Politics because He Has no Social Base’ [Rafighdoust: Mashi-ye Siyasi Rouhani Shabiye Khatami 
Nist / Ahmadinejad dar Siyasat Nemimanad Chun Payegah-ye Ejtemai Nadarad, Khabar Online, 23 Tir 
1392 / 14 July 2013.
55  ‘Khatami’s Warning against Raising the Expectations of  the People’ [Hoshdar Khatami Nesbat beh 
Bala Bordan Sath Togha’at Mardom], DW.de, 29 June 2013.
56   ‘Unlikely Fellow Travellers’ [Hamrahan Nahamrah], Kayhan Editorial, 27 Khordad 1392 / 17 June 2013.
57   ‘The Voting of  Those Who Don’t Believe in the System Is Indicative of  Their Trust in the Islamic 
Republic’ [Rai Dadan Kesani ke be Nezam Eteghadi Nadarand, Neshaneh Etmad Anha beh Jomhuri 
Eslami Ast], Digarban, 5 Tir 1392 / 26 June 2013.
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A New Dawn of Prudence, Moderation and Hope?
If  Rouhani campaigned on a platform of  prudence, moderation and hope, it would be 
fair to say that the response to his victory, especially among foreign observers, was high 
on hope and less clear on moderation and prudence. Much like the general relief  that 
greeted Obama’s dramatic election victory in the USA, the bar had been set so low that 
the mere fact that the new president was thoughtful and articulate was almost a revolu-
tion in itself. In the context of  a government that thought nothing of  fabricating their 
academic qualifications, the fact that Rouhani actually did finally receive a doctorate 
(albeit from Glasgow Caledonian rather than Glasgow University as Rouhani’s website 
initially suggested) was read as progress (he had nonetheless been using the title for some 
years before that). Similarly, while boasts of  his language fluency were wildly exaggerated, 
compared to his predecessor,  he was clearly fluent in at least two languages.58 
Nevertheless, if  Rouhani campaigned with periodic poetic flourishes, he has since governed 
in (a very cautious) prose. On issues sensitive to the political establishment, he has been 
careful to tread lightly and to err on the side of  caution when clarity might be expected. 
A good example of  this were his comments on Israel and the Holocaust. Attending the 
Jerusalem Day (Quds Day) march in Tehran in 2013, Rouhani was careful in his choice of 
words, avoiding the bombast which had come to characterise his predecessor. Talking of 
a wound on the body politic of  Islam, and the pain caused by the occupation of  Al-Quds 
(Jerusalem) and Palestine, Rouhani found his words over-interpreted by both foreign and 
domestic journalists. Iranian journalists rushed to impose a narrative of  ‘removal’ more 
akin to Ahmadinejad, while a number of  foreign observers concluded generously that all 
he was talking about was the occupied territories.59 Similarly, when asked by an American 
interviewer if  he believed the Holocaust had occurred, Rouhani demurred and said he 
was not a historian.60
58  The view that Rouhani was a linguist of  considerable ability was often repeated, see for example: 
Fraser Nelson, ‘Made in Glasgow: The New Iranian President, Hassan Rouhani’, The Spectator, 15 June 
2013. Available at: http://blogs.spectator.co.uk/2013/06/iran-may-have-just-elected-a-glasgow-man-
as-president/ (accessed 20 October 2016). However, the two languages he would appear to be proficient 
in are Persian and Arabic. For his mastery of  English, see: Ryan Reza Razavi, ‘Rouhani Speaking in 
English!’ YouTube, 27 September 2013. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UjUueOWT-
GzQ (accessed 20 October 2016).
59  Manuchehr Lenziran, ‘Ahmadinejad and Hassan Rouhani Comment about Israel in Quds Day’, 
YouTube, 2 August 2013. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LotuwjT2Cq0 (accessed 20 
October 2016).
60   See: AussieNews1, ‘Hassan Rohani Interview with American NBC (Farsi)’, YouTube, 21 September 
2013. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t73yPTnZdxY (accessed 30 October 2016). In 
a subsequent interview on CNN, Rouhani condemned ‘whatever criminality they [the Nazis] commit-
ted against the Jews’, studiously avoiding the word Holocaust and continuing to stress that he was not a 
historian: Josh Levs and Mick Krever, ‘Iran’s New President: Yes, the Holocaust Happened’, Amanpour, 
25 September 2013. Available at: http://amanpour.blogs.cnn.com/2013/09/25/irans-new-president-
yes-the-holocaust-happened/ (accessed 30 October 2016). On the controversy around his judicious 
use of  words and their interpretation by CNN among others, see: Arash Karimi, ‘Rouhani’s Holocaust 
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Such ‘prudence’ and ‘moderation’ might be better understood in the context of  the real-
ities of  Iranian politics, and measured against them rather than against more abstract 
notions that may be applicable in the West. Rouhani became president at a time when 
the culture of  deference to the authority of  the Supreme Leader reached levels unprece-
dented since the death of  Ayatollah Khomeini, and many would argue that Khamenei’s 
involvement in the day-to-day management of  the state is perhaps even greater than that 
of  his predecessor.61 Hossein Shariatmadari’s pointed comments aside, Ayatollah Khame-
nei has himself  since reiterated the centrality of  his position in an extensive series of 
fatwas issued on his website which reiterated with no ambiguity that obedience to the vali-e 
faqih was the equivalent to obedience to the Prophet of  Islam.62 
There is no ambiguity about this statement. Nearly a decade of  consolidation has ensured 
that those institutions of  accountability which might restrict the leader’s powers – most 
obviously the Assembly of  Experts – have been largely emasculated, and the string of  con-
gratulations and expressions of  gratitude, to say nothing of  Rouhani’s insistence that he 
has ‘full authority’ to pursue his policies, are all indicative of  the fact that even if  Khame-
nei’s power has retreated, his authority remains intact. In many ways, this is the deal that 
has been struck to ensure a smooth transition of  executive power, an executive power that 
is nonetheless more prime ministerial than presidential in character. Indeed throughout 
Rouhani’s first term, while Khamenei has shown ‘heroic flexibility’, he has been quick to 
rebuke his President when necessary and, perhaps more importantly, Rouhani has been 
quick to fall back into line.63 In sum, Rouhani’s election should not be read principally as 
a setback for Khamenei’s authoritarian approach and exercise of  power.  If  Khamenei 
was forced to bend, it was more the result of  what might be classically termed a ‘baronial 
Comments on CNN Spark Controversy’, Al-Monitor, 26 September 2016. Available at: http://iranpulse.
al-monitor.com/index.php/2013/09/2894/rouhanis-holocaust-comments-on-cnn-spark-controversy/ 
(accessed 30 October 2016). See also: Max Fisher, ‘Hassan Rouhani’s Jewish Problem’, Washington Post, 26 
September 2013; Adam Levick, ‘Hassan Rouhani Did Not Use the Word “Holocaust”’, YouTube, 6 Octo-
ber 2013. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gFdx00uj1IU (accessed 30 October 2016).
61   A good recent example of  this development was the secretary of  the National Security Council, 
Ali Shamkhani, declaring that Iran’s presence in Syria was a result of  a divine ‘revelation’ received by 
Khamenei. Contrary to this declaration, such ‘revelations’ are normally the preserve of  prophets. ‘The 
Iranian Military Presence in Syria Is Based on a Divine Revelation to Ali Khamenei’ [Hozur Nezami 
Iran dar Soorieh Bar Asas ‘Vahe Elahi be Ali Khamenei’ Ast], Saham News Online, 11 Khordad 1395 / 
31 May 2016. For details of  this development see: Ali Ansari, ‘L’Etat C’est Moi: The Paradox of  Sultan-
ism and the Question of  Regime Change in Modern Iran’, International Affairs 89, 2 (2013), pp. 283–298.
62   The full list can be found here: ‘The Latest Fatwas of  the Leader in Relation to the Use of  the 
Internet, Satellite Dishes, Working with Zionist Companies’ [Tazetarin Fatva-ye Rahbari dar Baraye 
Estfadeh az Internet, Mahvareh, Moameleh ba Sherkat-ha Zionisti], Tasnim News Agency, 8 Mordad 
1392 / 30 July 2013.
63  ‘The Leader of  Iran’s Riposte to Those Who Say that Tomorrow’s World is One of  Dialogue not 
Missiles, [Hoshdar-e Tond Rahbar Iran be Kesani ke Mogoyand Donyaye Farad Donyaye Mozakereh 
Ast na Moshak], BBC Persian, 30 March 2016. See also: ‘I Proclaim without Hesitation that the Leader 
is Leader of  Us All / According to Religious, Legal and National Tradition, We Are All, in Totality, His 
Disciples’ [Ba Serahat Elam Mikonam, Rahbari, Rahbar-e Hameye Mast / Tebgh Mayarhare Shari, 
Qanunin va Melli, be Tor Kamel as Rahnamoodhaye Ishan Tabiat Mikoneem], Entekhab, 9 Farvardin 
1395 / 28th March 2016.
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revolt’ born of  political dissatisfaction with Ahmadinejad and the dangerous economic 
malaise that was a consequence of  his presidency, than of  any sudden affectation for 
democratic values. 
In 2009 the elites held firm and united behind a leader faced with the prospect of  a 
popular upheaval. Their interests lay in stability, and however much some may have crit-
icised the detail and the handling of  the situation, ultimately they held together. But the 
bitterness that emerged in 2009 came home to roost in 2013, and the anger was made 
all the more acute by a weakening economy exposed by damaging sanctions that hurt 
revenue. Much has been made of  Hashemi Rafsanjani’s speech in which he blamed the 
Syrian regime for using chemical weapons on its own citizens. Of  equal interest is the 
bleak picture Rafsanjani paints of  the Iranian economy.64 Even allowing for a degree 
of  exaggeration as one administration replaces another, the scale of  the economic crisis 
facing Iran is striking. All the more so when one considers the magnitude of  the oil rev-
enue enjoyed by Ahmadinejad – far in excess of  anything enjoyed by his predecessors 
spread lavishly in acts of  patronage which made the select few very rich, at the expense 
of  structural investment in the economy. The opportunity cost of  the last eight years will 
undoubtedly be scrutinised by Iranian economists for some time; suffice to say that the 
books are only now being properly assessed, and the early revelations are not positive.65
It was this economic urgency that drove Rouhani’s election, helped maintain a pragmatic 
– if  Conservative – alliance behind him, and provided him with his political raison d’être.  It 
should come as no surprise, even if  it has been a disappointment to his Reformist support-
ers, that the economy has remained his priority. It has shaped his choice of  cabinet – as 
he drew on a range of  technocratic expertise largely affiliated to Rafsanjani’s ‘Servants of 
Construction’ – and driven his policy choices, including the important decision to re-es-
tablish the Plan and Budget Organisation, unceremoniously abolished by Ahmadinejad 
in 2007. Most obviously it shaped his approach towards foreign policy. 
Few appointments reflect this better than Rouhani’s appointment of  Mohammad Javad 
Zarif  as Foreign Minister. Zarif  is widely regarded as one of  the most competent diplo-
mats in the Iranian Foreign Ministry, well versed in the cultural norms of  the West, and of 
the USA in particular. Just as Rouhani’s task has been to normalise Iran’s domestic politics 
after the turmoil of  Ahmadinejad, so too has Zarif ’s task been to reset Iran’s foreign rela-
tions, specifically through the lifting of  sanctions and the rebalancing of  the Republic’s 
64  Manuchehr Lenziran, ‘Controversial Video of  Hashemi Rafsanjani Speech about Syria’, YouTube, 
2 September 2013. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c3nou_VLLKA (accessed 30 
October 2016). MEMRITVVideos, ‘Hashemi Rafsanjani: Syrians Were Bombed with Chemicals by 
Their Own Government’, YouTube, 3 September 2013. Available at: http://www.memritv.org/clip/
en/3967.htm (accessed 30 October 2016).  See also: ‘Hashemi: In the Last Eight Years We Have Lost 
$800bn’, [Hashemi: Dar Hasht Sal Gozashteh 800 Milliard Dollar az Dast Raft], Radiofarda, 10 Mordad 
1392 / 1 August 2013.
65  ‘Ahmadinejad’s Weaknesses Have Put Iran Back 16 Years’ [Zaaf-haye Ahmadinejad Iran ra 16 Sal 
Aqab Bord], Digarban, 10 Shahrivar 1392 / 1 September 2013; ‘Reserves of  Basic Goods, 15 Days or a 
Few Months, Who Is Accountable?’ [Zakhireh-ye Kalahaye Asasi; 15 Rooz ya Chand Mah, Che Kesi 
Pasokhgoost?] Kaleme, 27 Shahrivar 1392 / 17 September 2013.
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international economic relations. Important distinctions emerged within the elite about 
the precise aims and possible consequences of  this development, which reached fruition 
in July 2015 after some two years of  lengthy, tortuous negotiations. But these differences 
were subsumed for the period of  negotiations, on the basis that a termination of  the 
sanctions regime against Iran was necessary – if  for no other reason than to eliminate 
the international consensus that Ahmadinejad’s administration had, by dint of  herculean 
mismanagement, succeeded in corralling against Iran. All this new found ‘realism’ in 
both domestic and foreign policy was justified by Khamenei on the basis of  a narrative of 
‘heroic flexibility’, a phrase alluding to the compromises made by the second Shiʿa Imam, 
Hassan, generating perhaps more heat than light, and allowing some to enthusiastically 
suggest that Khamenei had indeed turned over a new leaf.66 But the limitations of  what 
Khamenei insisted was a transactional arrangement with no ramifications for broader 
US–Iran relations, were soon to become apparent.
Postscript: The Politics of Managing Change
The tendency to read into events what one wishes is not a failing unique to analysts of 
Iran, nor, one might add, is it limited to observers, frequently affecting those practitioners 
and participants who seek to make sense of  the chaotic political environment within 
which they operate. 
For many Iranians, the Ahmadinejad presidency was nothing short of  a catastrophe that 
did untold damage to the political and economic fabric of  the country. The trauma was so 
deep and the need for salvation so great, that Rouhani represented the great hope of  the 
nation – the person who would restore balance and a measure of  harmony to the politics 
of  the country. The expectation was matched by an unusual degree of  realism and com-
promise on the part of  many who were happy to defer demands in the anticipation that 
substantive and meaningful change would come eventually. 
Rouhani for his part, while promising much (especially at election time), has been happy 
to defer the more difficult aspects of  his election platform on the basis that one must walk 
before one runs and that excessive demands will only result in a destructive reaction, 
much in the same way as the Conservative reaction undid the Khatami presidency. Much 
of  this is a tendentious reading of  the Khatami presidency, which also implies that Khat-
ami was instinctively a much less able steward of  change and the country’s affairs than his 
putative successor. It conveniently ignores the enormous pressures placed on the Khatami 
presidency from a variety of  Conservative-dominated institutions, not least the assassina-
tion attempt on his chief  strategist, Saeed Hajjarian, rendered paraplegic by the attempt.
66  ‘Ayatollah Khamenei: Now Is the Age of  “Heroic Flexibility”’ [Ayatollah Khamenei: Zaman 
‘Narmesh-e Gharemani’ Ast], Khodnevis, 26 Shahrivar 1392 / 17 September 2013; ‘Heroic Flexibility 
Is Only a Tactical Change’ [Narmesh Gharemaneh Tanha yek Taghir-e Taktiki Ast], Digarban, 28 
Shahrivar 2013 / 19 September 2013. 
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The reality is that Rouhani has not even begun to attempt some of  the changes that Kha-
tami pursued, and his tentative forays into political and economic reform have resulted in 
some vigorous kick-back from hardline institutions, not least the Supreme Leader. Despite 
promising to deal with the house arrest of  Green Movement leaders for example, there 
has been no progress over the last three years. Initial suggestions that he would seek to 
address the rights deficit with the appointment of  a special presidential envoy to investi-
gate the drawing-up of  a charter of  civil rights have come to nought67, while the first drafts 
of  a law defining ‘political crimes’ were derided by Iranian lawyers for giving more rights 
to officials than to the people. 68 
Those anxious for change find that the horizon keeps receding. Rouhani initially indicated 
that the signing of  the Joint Comprehensive Plan of  Action (JCPOA) would be the ‘key’ 
to unblocking all of  Iran’s problems and gave the suspension of  sanctions as a deadline. 
Following this, a new deadline was given – victory in the parliamentary elections. Increas-
ingly now, the sense is that people will have to wait for Rouhani’s re-election in 2017. 
While periodic political successes have dampened criticism and maintained a sense of 
momentum, there is palpable frustration in some quarters at the lack of  substantive prog-
ress on a number of  issues, not least from the Green Movement leaders’ themselves, most 
obviously Mehdi Karroubi, who issued a scathing letter in the aftermath of  the parlia-
mentary elections demanding some resolution to his situation and a willingness to submit 
himself  for trial.69 At the same time, with every apparent success, Rouhani faces the par-
adoxical prospect of  mounting criticism as he fails to make the substantive changes that 
are required to deliver the results he has promised. A good example of  this paradox is the 
state of  the economy, which is currently languishing in a recession not of  his own making, 
but being blamed on him as a consequence of  raised expectations. Excitement at the 
JCPOA in July 2015 and the trumpeted lifting of  sanctions in January 2016 have in reality 
resulted in much less movement in the economy than might have been expected,70 while 
67  ‘The President Delegates His Legal Deputy to Prepare a Charter of  Citizen’s Rights’ [Mamoriat Rais 
Jomhur be Moavenat Hoqoqi Jahat Taheye Manshor Hoqoq Sharvandi], ISNA, 31 Shahrivar 1392 / 
22 September 2013.
68  The full draft can be read here, ‘Political Crimes’ [Jorm Siyasi], Tasmim News, 31 Shahrivar 1392 / 22 
September 2013.  Available at: http://www.tasnimnews.com/Home/Single/146499. For legal concerns 
see, ‘The Draft Law on Political Crimes Does Not Conform with the Views of  Lawyers’ [Tarh Jorm Siyasi 
ba Didgah ye Hoqoqdanan Montabegh Neest], Kaleme, 1 Mehr 1392 / 23 September 2013.
69  ‘Iranian Opposition Figure Karroubi Appeals for Court Hearing over ‘Election Rigging’, The Guard-
ian, 11 April 2016. 
70  See interview with Sadeq Zibakalam: ‘Rouhani Does Not Have a Successful Economic Record / 
His Record in the Social and Cultural Fields is even less Successful than the Economy’ [Rohani Kar-
nameye Movafagh dar Eqtesad Nadarad / Amalkard-e Rais Jomhur dar Hozeye Ejtemai va Farhangi 
az Eqtesad Ham na Movafaghtar Ast] Fars News Online, 25 Mordad 1395 / 15 August 2016. From his 
critics, such as Mohammad Javad Larijani (brother of  the Speaker) come warnings of  tougher sanctions 
yet to come: ‘We Should be Ready for Extensive Sanctions from America / The Foreign Ministry Has 
Tough Times Ahead Protesting against the Americans / America, instead of  Lifting the Sanctions, Has 
Given Us a Handful of  Sweets’ [Montazer Tahreemha-ye Besyar Azeem-e Amrika Bashim / Vezarat 
Kharej Roozgar-e Sakhti Baraye Shekayat az Emrika Darad / Emrika be Jaye Raf  Tahreemha ‘ab 
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Rouhani, having boasted of  the imminent peace dividend, finds himself  with less cover 
for failure in energising the economy or implementing coherent political reform.  In short, 
his management of  expectations has been less than ideal, driven by immediate political 
expediency and perhaps most curiously dependent on others to deliver.
If  one determining factor characterises the Rouhani presidency to date, it has been his 
tendency to approach problems indirectly, at most enabling others to take the necessary 
action, but rarely taking the lead himself  other than to provide a rhetorical frame of 
reference. It can be argued that in light of  the failures encountered by both Presidents 
Rafsanjani and Khatami, this ‘indirect’ approach is the best way to encourage a system 
with a proven track record of  resisting change to be teased into it. Yet neither of  his prede-
cessors were as radical as posterity pretends, and both were criticised in their own time for 
the deferential manner in which they sought to handle the Conservative centres of  power. 
Both became frustrated by their inability to move things forward. Khatami’s approach 
was considered more threatening because of  its overtly political dimension and Rouhani’s 
approach has much more in common with Rafsanjani’s tendency to see salvation through 
economic reform. But, arguably, Rouhani has been even less proactive that his erstwhile 
mentor, looking to change the broader environment – such as sanctions relief  – with a 
view to enabling wider reforms.71 Sanctions relief  as he has liked to argue, is the key that 
will unlock Iran’s potential. This potential moreover will be realised by the attraction of 
foreign investment which will open the way for more general domestic investment. But 
this is a somewhat simplistic reading of  Iran’s economic predicament which even his own 
ministers have found troubling and which the initial suspension of  sanctions has exposed 
as hollow.72 
There is a logic to Rouhani’s rhetoric of  recovery, and like both Rafsanjani and Khat-
ami, he will have to confront it sooner or later. If  he is genuine about developing Iran’s 
economy and bringing prosperity to its people, steps will need to be taken to adapt Iran 
to the international economic environment – including some form of  reconciliation with 
the USA, with which it seeks to integrate and from which he seeks investment. Iran will, 
in short, have to make itself  more transparent, accountable and, above all, competitive. 
It would seem unlikely that for all his caution, Rouhani is oblivious to this reality, given 
Nabat-e Dastedar Dade], Tasnim Online, 25 Mordad 1395 / 15 August 2016. ‘The JCPOA, by way of 
an Experience, Has Proved the Pointlessness of  Negotiating with the Americans’ [Barjam, be Onvan-e 
yek Tajrobeh, Binatijeh Boodan Mozakereh ba Amrikaya ra Sabet Kard], Entekhab Online, 11 Mordad 
1395 / 3 August 2016.
71  There is one striking difference however. While Khatami’s administration actively sought to engage 
with the USA socially and economically, if  not politically, Zarif  has claimed that Rouhani’s adminis-
tration has no desire to engage with the US economy. An aspiration which is frankly at odds with the 
globalised economy in which we live.
72  ‘The Joint Letter of  the Ministers to the President: Take Urgent Decisions on the Economy’ 
[Nameh-ye Moshtarak-e Vazir be Rais Jomhur: Tasmim Zarbol Ajal Eqtesdai Begereed], Mehr News 
Online, 12 Mehr 1394 / 4 October 2015. The salary scandal, in which it transpired some officials were 
in receipt of  monthly salaries of  up to $200,000 has hit the administration particularly hard with many 
incredulous that in four years he has been unable to curtail such excesses, see: ‘Salary Scandal Forces 
Resignations at Iranian Banks’, Financial Times, 5 July 2016.
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the people he has surrounded himself  with and his own aspiration to follow the current 
JCPOA with further ‘political’ ones.73 But some have begun to question his willingness to 
grasp the nettle and address these issues. 
Rouhani would like foreign direct investment to trigger a wider change in Iran’s economic 
environment, which will in turn catalyse political reform through the need for more trans-
parency, accountability, stability and taxation. In this sense, he has taken a step back from 
his mentor Rafsanjani, who focused on the domestic economy, and Khatami, who shifted 
towards broader political economy. For Rouhani, the trigger will be foreigners investing, 
for which sanctions relief  has been the enabling factor. But it is increasingly apparent 
that this is an insufficient ignition for an engine that has lain dormant for so long. What 
is required are internal reforms that will engage the outside world, and herein lies the 
problem his predecessors encountered. Such reforms are identified with ‘regime change’ 
by much of  the hardline establishment, including the Supreme Leader, who regards any 
attempt to change behaviour and policy to be tantamount to ‘sedition’ and wholly against 
the principles of  the Revolution (as they see them). Indeed they left Rouhani in no doubt 
of  this in their aggressive response to his suggestion of  successive JCPOAs.74 Until this 
ideological block is addressed, Iranian politics will fail to escape from a seemingly perpet-
ual dialectic of  reform and reaction towards a new ‘synthesis’ of   ideas for a world that has 
moved on. Paradoxically, the Revolution will have singularly failed to ‘revolutionise itself ’. 
73  See Rouhani’s press conference: ‘JCPOA 2 Should Start to Bring Prosperity for Iran / We Do Not 
Want a Subordinated Parliament to the Government / Americans Should Be More Active for Imple-
menting JCPOA’, Official Website of  the President of  the Islamic Republic of  Iran, 6 March 2016. Available 
at: http://www.president.ir/en/92328 (accessed 20 October 2016). See also Zarif ’s Admission: Rick 
Gladstone, ‘Iran Not Seeking Entry to U.S. Financial System, Envoy Says’, The New York Times, 20 April 
2016. Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/21/world/middleeast/iran-nuclear-deal-mo-
hammad-javad-zarif.html?_r=0 (accessed 20 October 2016).
74  More benign criticisms have sought to portray Rouhani (and Zarif) as latter day Mosaddeqs – well 
intentioned but dangerously reliant on American goodwill. Khamenei has gone further and berated 
those who have advocated further ‘negotiations’ – the two most prominent individuals being Rou-
hani and Rafsanjani – as either ignorant or stupid. ‘The Meaning of  Ayatollah Khamenei’s Harsh 
Response to Rouhani’s Proposal about JCPOA 2’ [Mani ye Pasokh-e Tond Ayatollah Khamenei be 
Ezharat Rohani dar Mored-e Barjam Do], BBC Persian Online, 16 March 2016. ‘The Harsh Warning of 
the Leader of  Iran against Those Who Say the Future is one of  Negotiations not Missiles’ [Hoshdar 
Tond Rahbar-e Iran be Kesani ke Migoyand Donya-ye Fard Donya-ye Mozakereh Ast na Mooshak], 
BBC Persian Online, 16 March 2016.
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